

Message Text

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ORIGIN SS-15

INFO OCT-01 ARA-10 EUR-12 ISO-00 PM-05 ACDA-12 CIAE-00
INR-10 IO-13 L-03 NSAE-00 EB-08 NRC-05 OES-07
SOE-02 DODE-00 DOE-15 SP-02 CEQ-01 SSO-00 INRE-00
NSCE-00 /121 R

DRAFTED BY S/AS:R KELLEY
APPROVED BY S/AS:AMB SMITH
T/D:DR NYE
EUR/NE:MR NEWLIN

-----109255 122326Z /64

O R 122240Z APR 78
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE IMMEDIATE
INFO AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY BONN
AMEMBASSY BRASILIA

S E C R E T STATE 094273

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PARM, TECH, MNUC, NL

SUBJECT: VAN DER KLAAUW MEETING WITH GERARD SMITH

1. FOREIGN MINISTER VAN DER KLAAUW MET WITH GERARD SMITH
APRIL 11 FOR NEARLY ONE HOUR. PARTICIPANTS ON U.S. SIDE
WERE SMITH, DR. JOSEPH NYE (T/D), WILLIAM NEWLIN (EUR/NE),
AND ROBERT KELLEY (S/AS); ON DUTCH SIDE WERE VAN DER KLAAUW,
AGE R. TAMMENOMS BAKKER, AMB. TO THE U.S., M.H. RUTTEN,
DIR.GEN. FOR POLITICAL AFFAIRS, MIN. OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS,
E.J. VAN VLOTTEN, DIR. FOR NATO AFFAIRS, MIN. OF FOREIGN
AFFAIRS, T.J.F. DANIELS, DIR. FOR WESTERN HEMISPHERE AFFAIRS,
MIN. OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, WILLEM ROSEDORP, FIRST SECRETARY.

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HOWEVER, FOR THE DUTCH TO SWITCH FROM THE STORAGE REGIME

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INFO OCT-01 EUR-12 ISO-00 SS-15 /042 R

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DRAFTED BY:IO/SCT:ADJILLSON

APPROVED BY:IO:TBROWN

S/AS:RKELLY

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FM SECSTATE WASHDC

INFO AMEMBASSY VIENNA 0000

S E C R E T STATE 094273

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FOL STATE 094273 SENT ACTION THE HAGUE INFO LONDON BONN
BRASILIA APR 12, 1978 REPEATED TO YOU QUOTE

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Message Attributes

Automatic Decaptioning: X
Capture Date: 26 sep 1999
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Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Concepts: DISARMAMENT, MEETINGS, DIPLOMATIC DISCUSSIONS
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Copy: SINGLE
Draft Date: 12 apr 1978
Decaption Date: 01 jan 1960
Decaption Note:
Disposition Action: RELEASED
Disposition Approved on Date:
Disposition Case Number: n/a
Disposition Comment: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Date: 20 Mar 2014
Disposition Event:
Disposition History: n/a
Disposition Reason:
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Drafter: S/AS:R KELLEY
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Executive Order: 11652 GDS
Errors: n/a
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Film Number: D780157-1147
Format: TEL
From: STATE
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ISecure: 1
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Litigation Code IDs:
Litigation Codes:
Litigation History:
Locator: TEXT ON-LINE, TEXT ON MICROFILM
Message ID: 7937bda6-c288-dd11-92da-001cc4696bcc
Office: ORIGIN SS
Original Classification: SECRET
Original Handling Restrictions: n/a
Original Previous Classification: n/a
Original Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Page Count: 10
Previous Channel Indicators:
Previous Classification: SECRET
Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Reference: n/a
Retention: 0
Review Action: RELEASED, APPROVED
Review Content Flags:
Review Date: 24 jun 2005
Review Event:
Review Exemptions: n/a
Review Media Identifier:
Review Release Date: n/a
Review Release Event: n/a
Review Transfer Date:
Review Withdrawn Fields: n/a
SAS ID: 2829978
Secure: OPEN
Status: NATIVE
Subject: VAN DER KLAUW MEETING WITH GERARD SMITH
TAGS: PARM, TECH, MNUC, NL, (SMITH, GERARD), (VAN DER KLAUW)
To: THE HAGUE INFO LONDON MULTIPLE
Type: TE
vdkgvwkey: odb://SAS/SAS.dbo.SAS_Docs/7937bda6-c288-dd11-92da-001cc4696bcc
Review Markings:
Sheryl P. Walter
Declassified/Released
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EO Systematic Review
20 Mar 2014
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